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Election Signs and Time Limits
Jules B. Gerard*
Signs exist for the sole purpose of communicating messages.
Hence, any regulation of signs is inevitably a regulation of speech
protected by the First Amendment. The message, however, is only
one aspect of a sign. A sign’s other constituent element is the
structure upon which the message is displayed. Many communities
have wished to regulate those structures in the interests of aesthetics,
or safety, or some combination of the two. The regulations have
attempted to limit the location, the size, the number, or other features
of the structures upon which the messages may be displayed. Because
these regulations inevitably affect the communications that are
intended to be displayed on the structures, they raise constitutional
issues of free speech.1
These issues become particularly difficult when the signs being
regulated convey political messages. Relatively small, disposable
signs are a traditional way of communicating political messages.
They may be the least expensive way political speakers have of
reaching large audiences. They therefore hold enormous appeal to
those candidates for political office who are relatively unknown and
lack so-called “name recognition.”2 Most importantly, political
messages dealing with ballot issues are at the apex of the hierarchy of
speech values protected by the First Amendment.3
* Professor of Law, Emeritus, Washington University School of Law. A.B. 1957, J.D.
1958, Washington University. I am honored to participate in this celebration of Daniel R.
Mandelker, who very early on recognized the significance of applying the First Amendment to
land use controls. He conceived the book FEDERAL LAND USE LAW, and asked me to join him
as co-author. I am indebted to him for that opportunity and for his many other kindnesses over
the years.
1. See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., FEDERAL LAND USE LAW §§ 7.01-7.12
(1999) [hereafter FEDERAL LAND USE LAW].
2. See, e.g., Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1076 (3d Cir. 1994); John
Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1980), aff’d, 453 U.S. 916 (1981). The
effectiveness of signs as a means of achieving name recognition was the subject of disputed
expert testimony in Rappa.
3. See, e.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (The constitutional
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On the other hand, because these signs are cheap they proliferate
like weeds during election cycles. Few of them are items of beauty.
This absence of visual appeal combined with their numbers make
them real eyesores in otherwise attractive residential communities.
Moreover, they are flimsy in construction, easily damaged or
destroyed by rain, snow, wind or vandals. They are frequently blown
or thrown into the street, creating driver safety and trash disposal
problems. They therefore are a prime target of those who wish to
eliminate visual clutter from their community’s environment in the
interests of beauty, and perhaps also of safety.
This article tries to cast light into a small corner of this problem. It
deals with a question the United States Supreme Court has never
answered directly, namely, whether a community may impose time
limits on the periods during which signs carrying messages about
election issues may be displayed.4 The article begins with a brief
survey of relevant Supreme Court decisions before coming to grips
with that question.
Two aspects of this discussion require emphasis. The first is that
the subject is “election” (or “campaign”) signs, not “political” signs.
The former are doubtless a subcategory of the latter. Yet, “political”
signs include a great many messages, such as “Save the Whales,” for
example, that are not tied to a specific date or time period. Hence,
imposing time limits on such signs would be difficult to justify in
terms of regulating their structures. Second, billboards and other
permanent structures are excluded from consideration. Imposing time
limits on whatever election messages such structures might display
contributes nothing to either aesthetics or safety. Political messages
are no more or less objectionable on billboards than are any other
constitutionally protected communications.5
protection afforded political speech has its “fullest and most urgent application precisely to the
conduct of campaigns for political office.”).
4. For other efforts, see Stephanie L. Bunting, Unsightly Politics: Aesthetics, Sign
Ordinances, and Homeowners’ Speech in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
473 (1996); Daniel N. McPherson, Municipal Regulation of Political Signs: Balancing First
Amendment Rights Against Aesthetic Concerns, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 767 (1997); Thomas
Stephen Neuberger & Daniel T. Smith, The First Amendment Implications of State Regulation
of Candidate Political Speech Through Election Signs, 14 ST. L.U. PUB. L. REV. 571 (1995).
5. See, e.g., Orazio v. Town of North Hempstead, 426 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
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I. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. Background
Fundamental First Amendment doctrine provides the background
against which to view relevant Supreme Court decisions. That
doctrine divides regulations of speech into two classes. The first class
consists of laws that regulate speech because of its content, such as
bans on obscenity and perjury. Traditional doctrine refers to this class
as “content based” regulations. Except for a few narrowly defined
subcategories, content based regulations must pass strict scrutiny
analysis to survive a constitutional challenge. That is, they must be
necessary to further compelling governmental interests and must be
the least restrictive alternative available to further those interests.
The second class consists of regulations that purport to be
unconcerned about message content but nevertheless have the effect
of limiting speech. The first Supreme Court decision on measures of
this type approved an ordinance that imposed restrictions on parades.6
The Court observed that governments might have legitimate interests
in limiting the times or the places at which, or the manner in which,
speech is delivered.7 The Court referred to such limitations as “time,
place and manner” restrictions, a term by which they are still known.8
Regulations of this kind are held to a standard less rigorous than strict
scrutiny. To be constitutional, they need only (a) be content neutral,
(b) further significant or substantial (but not compelling)
governmental interests, and (c) leave open adequate alternative
channels of communication. The requirement that they be “no greater
than necessary” to protect the governmental interests was added
later.9 The Court has made plain that the “no greater than necessary”
requirement under this standard is significantly less stringent than the
6. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
     7. Id. at 575-76.
8. Id.
9. Support for the statements about constitutional standards in the last two paragraphs
can be found in LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2 (2d ed. 1988);
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.2.1 (1997); and
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE
THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT §§ 3.01-3.04 (Student ed. 1994).
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“least restrictive alternative” requirement of strict scrutiny.10
A word needs to be said about the concept of content neutrality.
Early cases addressing this issue involved blatant discrimination
against unpopular views. For example, Jehovah’s Witnesses were
denied the use of a public park that other religious groups were
routinely granted permission to use.11 Cases such as these were the
genesis of the Court’s often repeated statement that discrimination
based on content is virtually per se unconstitutional. That formulation
is problematic because of the word “content.” It clearly includes
“viewpoints.” That is, discrimination against an unpopular viewpoint
is certainly discrimination based on content. The reasons
governments should be denied the power to discriminate against
viewpoints are virtually self-evident. They all center on the danger of
giving government the power to censor speech. Content, however,
also includes “subject matter.”12 Why governments should absolutely
and totally be denied the power to discriminate on the basis of subject
matter is not clear. For example, suppose the city in the Jehovah’s
Witnesses case prohibited the use of its public park for religious
purposes. That would constitute subject matter rather than viewpoint
discrimination. There would be no danger of government censorship.
The denial still might be unconstitutional, but the reasons offered for
finding it so obviously would have to be (or should have to be, at any
rate) different from those that were given to strike down the
viewpoint discrimination.
Currently, the Supreme Court continues to articulate the standard
as one of content neutrality. Sometimes it will accept viewpoint
neutrality as fulfilling the requirement,13 however, and sometimes it
10. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797 (1989) (“[R]estrictions on
the time, place, or manner of protected speech are not invalid ‘simply because there is some
imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech.’ . . . Lest any confusion on the
point remain, we reaffirm today that a regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected
speech . . . need not be the least-restrictive or least-intrusive means. . ..”).
11. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
12. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV.
189 (1983).
13. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640 (1981). Heffron upheld a statute that required everyone who wished to do a number of
things at the state fair, including solicit money, to do so from booths that were rented on a first
come, first served, basis. Id. at 643-44. Because the restricted speech— soliciting money— was
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/14
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will not.14 And sometimes it insists that the standard requires both
content and viewpoint neutrality.15
B. The Cases
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego was the first Supreme
Court decision to apply free speech principles to sign regulations.16
San Diego’s ordinance generally banned “outdoor advertising display
signs.” The ordinance exempted two categories of signs. The first
category consisted of on-site signs that identified the premises or the
items produced or sold there. The second category consisted of
twelve specifically described displays. A splintered Court held the
ordinance unconstitutional.17 The nine justices divided into three
groups with five opinions: a plurality of four, a concurrence of two,
and three dissents. The gist of the concurring opinion was that the
ordinance effectively banned all billboards and that such a total ban
ought to be invalid.18 The plurality overturned the ordinance for
completely different reasons. They focused on the two categories of
exemptions. The category that exempted on-site signs was
unconstitutional because it limited the content of such signs to
commercial messages.19 Political messages, for example, could not be
displayed. It was impermissible to prefer commercial to traditional
speech in this manner (the “commercial speech preference”
rationale).20 The other category exempted twelve specifically defined
displays. Seven of them were defined by content, including
governmental signs (street identifiers, traffic controls, and the like)
and temporary political signs. The plurality refused to deal with these
identified by content, the statute clearly was content based. But since it was applicable to
everyone, it was viewpoint neutral. The Court described it as content neutral. Id. at 648-49.
14. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), discussed infra
notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
15. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U.S.
530, 536-37 (1980).
16. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 490. For a more detailed description and analysis, see
FEDERAL LAND USE LAW, supra note 1, at § 7.02.
17. Id. at 521.
18. Id. at 521-40.
19. Id. at 513.
20. For criticism of this aspect of Metromedia, see FEDERAL LAND USE LAW, supra note
1, at § 7.02[3][b][i].
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content subcategories individually. Instead, they lumped them
together and declared this entire category of exemptions invalid
because of content discrimination (the “discrimination” rationale).21
The dissents criticized this part of the plurality opinion harshly. First,
they argued, the ordinance was viewpoint albeit not content neutral,
and viewpoint neutrality ought to be enough. Second, some of the
exemptions, like that for political signs, enhanced free speech values
rather than detracted from them.
Two difficulties stand in the way of accepting Metromedia’s
content discrimination rationale at face value, difficulties that remain
unresolved to this day. One of the twelve specifically defined
exemptions was of For Sale signs. The Supreme Court had held it
unconstitutional to ban For Sale signs.22 San Diego merely
incorporated the Court’s mandate into its ordinance’s provisions.
Another exemption was for temporary political signs. San Diego’s
original ordinance did not contain this provision. It was added only
after a local federal court had invalidated another city’s ordinance for
being too restrictive of political signs.23 The upshot is that an
ordinance that does not contain the exemptions is invalid because it
fails to protect speech in accordance with judicial decisions; but an
ordinance that does contain them is invalid because of content
discrimination. Surely the Court did not intend to place municipalities
in this impossible Catch-22!
The second difficulty has to do with the exemption for
governmental signs. Whether it is possible to draft a definition of
“sign” that does not include street identifiers, traffic controls, etc.,
without running afoul of the prohibition against content
discrimination is debatable.24 It is indisputable, however, that drafting
such a definition would be extraordinarily difficult. Metromedia
21. 453 U.S. at 515-17.
22. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91-98 (1977).
23. See Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976). Moreover, on the same
day it decided Metromedia, the Court summarily affirmed John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell,
639 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1980), aff’d, 453 U.S. 916 (1981). That case struck down Maine’s anti-
billboard statute partly on the ground that it did not contain an exemption for political signs.
24. For a heroic effort to create definitions that satisfy judicial requirements, see DANIEL
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offers no explanation why free speech values require this onerous
task to be undertaken. It goes without saying, of course, that these
kinds of governmental signs are absolutely indispensable to all
municipalities. Given the apparent absence of any First Amendment
interests that need protection, it seems unlikely the Court meant to
suggest that municipalities must forgo sign regulation entirely if they
choose to install such essential signs.
Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for
Vincent was decided three years later.25 At issue was a Los Angeles
ordinance that prohibited attaching signs to many types of
government property, including lamp posts. A candidate for public
office, whose signs had been torn down by the city, challenged the
ordinance. The Court upheld the ordinance by a vote of six to three.
Justice Stephens, who dissented in Metromedia, wrote the majority
opinion. He emphasized that the ordinance was viewpoint neutral, the
same argument he had urged unsuccessfully in his Metromedia
dissent. The ordinance, therefore, was entitled to be evaluated under
standards for time, place, and manner regulations. Two issues were
involved. The first was whether the city’s interests in aesthetics were
sufficient to justify this impairment of speech. The Court held that
they were. Accumulations of signs on public property were a
significant evil that could be prohibited. The weight of this interest
was not reduced by the city’s failure to outlaw signs on private
property. Private owners were thereby empowered to communicate
by temporary signs, which enhanced speech. Moreover, the concerns
of such owners for the beauty of their own property would tend to
reduce undesirable visual clutter. The second issue was whether the
ordinance’s restrictions were no greater than necessary to protect the
city’s interests. Again, the Court gave an affirmative answer. The
ordinance “did no more than eliminate the exact source of the evil it
sought to remedy.”26
Two reasons support the argument that Vincent implicitly
overruled the content discrimination rationale of Metromedia. The
first is Vincent’s repeated emphasis on the need for viewpoint rather
25. Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
26. Id. at 808.
Washington University Open Scholarship
p379+Gerard.doc 01/04/01
386 Festschrift [Vol. 3:379
than content neutrality.27 The second is that the Los Angeles
ordinance in Vincent contained a host of specific exemptions that
were similar or identical to those that had proved fatal to the San
Diego ordinance in Metromedia.28 The Vincent Court simply ignored
them.
Before returning to the subject of sign regulation, the Court
rendered a decision that has major significance to this discussion. The
zoning ordinance challenged in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc. prohibited theaters that showed sexually explicit films from
locating within one thousand feet of any residential zone, school,
church, or park. 29 Since the ordinance’s classification was based on
the type of movies that were offered, the challengers claimed content
discrimination. The ordinance, however, was upheld by a vote of
seven to two. The Court began its analysis by observing that the usual
rule required content neutrality. The Court went on to hold, however,
that content neutrality is to be determined by looking at a regulation’s
purposes, not solely at its terms. If its purposes are unrelated to the
suppression of speech and if it is viewpoint neutral, then it is entitled
to be treated as a content neutral time, place, and manner regulation.
The purpose of this viewpoint neutral ordinance was to preserve the
quality of urban life by confining the adverse secondary effects of
constitutionally protected adult businesses to certain locales. Hence,
it was entitled to be treated as content neutral despite its terms.
Renton left two questions unanswered. First, how does one
determine whether the purpose of a content based regulation is to
control the secondary effects of speech rather than to suppress it?
Second, was the Renton doctrine limited to regulations of adult
businesses or was it applicable to other regulations of speech as well?
Boos v. Barry addressed both of these questions but resolved only the
first.30 The federal statute under review prohibited, within five
hundred feet of a foreign embassy, the display of any sign that tended
to bring that nation “into public odium.” The government argued that
27. See FEDERAL LAND USE LAW, supra note 1, at § 7.02[3][b][ii].
28. Id.
29. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986). For a more detailed
description and analysis, see id. § 8.02.
30. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
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the law should be treated as content neutral because its purpose was
to prevent the secondary effect of subjecting foreign diplomats to
speech that offends their dignity, an objective this nation had an
obligation to achieve under international law. The Court rejected the
argument by a vote of five to three. “Regulations that focus on the
direct impact of the speech on its audience,” as here, are regulations
of speech itself, not its secondary effects.31 A secondary effect under
Renton is one “that happens to be associated with that type of
speech,” such as the deterioration of neighborhoods, but is not the
direct result of the speech itself.32 “If the ordinance [in Renton] . . .
was justified by the city’s desire to prevent the psychological damage
it felt was associated with viewing adult movies, then analysis of the
measure as a content-based statute would have been appropriate.”33
Only the five justices in the majority addressed the issue of confining
Renton to restrictions on adult businesses and they divided three to
two. Justice O’Connor, who wrote the majority opinion, joined by
Justices Stevens and Scalia, appeared willing to use the Renton
analysis to determine content neutrality in all cases, including those
involving political speech, as was the subject here. Justices Brennan
and Marshall objected to that. The three dissenters argued that
international law made the government’s interest in this case
compelling and that the statute thus survived strict scrutiny review.
Hence, they did not reach the content neutrality issue.
That split in approach reappeared in Burson v. Freeman.34 The
ordinance at issue prohibited the display of political campaign signs
within one hundred feet of a polling place. Since only political
messages were banned, the ordinance was clearly content-based;
however, a splintered Court upheld it five to three. The five justices
in the majority divided into three groups, so there was no controlling
rationale. The plurality opinion for three of the five justices held that
the ordinance survived strict scrutiny because it served the
compelling governmental interest of protecting voters from fraud and
intimidation. That justification seems fanciful at best, as the dissent
     31. Id. at 321.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
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claimed, in view of the Court’s rejection of that same defense in Boos
v. Barry, where it made considerably more sense. Concurring, Justice
Scalia voted to sustain the measure as a permissible viewpoint neutral
regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding elections, an
eminently more plausible rationale.
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,35 brought to the
Court an ordinance regulating the presence of newsracks on public
sidewalks. The city claimed the measure furthered its interests in
safety (reducing obstacles that pedestrians might trip over) and in
aesthetics (newsracks being eyesores). Newsracks dispensing regular
newspapers, numbering about fifteen hundred, were permitted; those
dispensing publications consisting entirely of advertisements,
numbering sixty two, were not. The city justified this content
discrimination on the grounds that the ordinance was viewpoint
neutral and that commercial speech was entitled to less protection
than traditional speech. The Court rejected that justification and
struck down the ordinance. The distinction between publications
devoted entirely to commercial speech and those that included
traditional messages bore no relationship whatsoever to the interests
the city claimed to be protecting and thus failed the “no greater than
necessary” prong of the time, place, and manner standard. All
newsracks, irrespective of the content of the publications they
offered, contributed equally to the unsightliness of the environment
and to the danger of tripping pedestrians. Furthermore, it was
doubtful that removing sixty two of more than fifteen hundred
newsracks contributed meaningfully to the city’s beauty.
The Court’s most recent decision on sign controls is City of Ladue
v. Gilleo.36 A St. Louis suburb prohibited homeowners from
displaying any signs except residential identification, safety hazard,
and For Sale signs. Businesses, churches, schools, and a few other
organizations, were allowed to display signs forbidden to
homeowners. Ladue defended its ordinance primarily as a matter of
aesthetics, of preventing the uncontrolled proliferation of signs. A
unanimous Court declared the ordinance unconstitutional. The Court
accepted the city’s argument that since the ordinance was aimed at
35. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
36. 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
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controlling the secondary effects of signs rather than at suppressing
speech, it was entitled to be treated as a content neutral time, place,
and manner regulation. That acceptance at least implies the Court’s
agreement that the Renton doctrine is applicable outside the area of
adult business regulation, the issue Boos v. Barry left unresolved.
The Court gave two sets of reasons for striking down the
ordinance. One set was mentioned just briefly, almost as an aside.
Even if it were treated as a time, place, and manner regulation, the
Court said, the ordinance’s exemptions “diminish the credibility” of
the city’s aesthetics claim, and made it doubtful that the ordinance
actually furthered a significant governmental interest.37 The Court
thereby perpetuated the muddle that Metromedia created by refusing
to acknowledge or discuss the fact that federal court decisions
mandated some of the exemptions that condemned San Diego’s
measure as content discriminatory, such as the For Sale sign
exemption.38
Most of the Court’s opinion was devoted to the second set of
reasons, an analysis of the “alternative channels of communication”
prong of the time, place, and manner standard. Residential signs are a
particularly important medium of communication for a number of
reasons, the Court argued. A message displayed at a home has more
impact than it would have if displayed elsewhere, in part because it
identifies the speaker. Signs in front yards target neighbors, an
audience that is difficult to reach by other means. Residential signs
are cheap. They are also convenient. Even wealthy homeowners, who
might otherwise not participate publicly in a political debate, might
post one or more. They are especially important during political
campaigns. Finally, the opinion noted that many prior decisions had
emphasized that the home is a place that deserves special protections.
Hence, Ladue’s ordinance failed even the more relaxed standard of
scrutiny by not leaving open adequate alternative channels of
communication.
The Court concluded by saying that its decision “by no means
leaves the City powerless to address the ills that may be associated
with residential signs . . . [M]ore temperate measures could . . .
37. Id. at 52-53.
38. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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satisfy” its needs without harm to free speech interests.39 That
statement at least leaves open the possibility that reasonable time
limits would be viewed as “more temperate,” legitimate, restrictions.
II. ELECTION SIGNS AND TIME LIMITS
A. Identifying the Signs
The reason election signs are chosen as the subject of time limit
restrictions is that they pertain to events with definite dates. Their
importance, therefore, is bounded by time. Given the position of
speech about elections at the very apex of the hierarchy of values
protected by the First Amendment, however, it might be thought that
any measure that selects political speech for disfavored treatment is
ipso facto unconstitutional.40 That would be wrong. The Supreme
Court has on at least three occasions permitted just that.41 One of
those occasions was Burson v. Freeman, discussed earlier. Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights42 approved a city’s refusal to sell advertising
space on its buses for any political advertising on behalf of
candidates or public issues. Commercial ads were accepted; political
ads were not. Greer v. Spock43 upheld a regulation restricting political
speeches and the distribution of political literature on military bases.
These cases are, of course, distinguishable. For one thing, the latter
two involved governments acting as proprietors of property rather
than as regulators of society. The important point, however, is that
singling out political speech is not per se unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, the teachings of Metromedia and Discovery
Network must not be ignored. The reasons for wishing to impose time
limits on election signs are equally applicable to signs pertaining to
other time bound events, such as garage (or tag) sales, homes for sale,
lost pets, neighborhood gatherings, and the like. The commercial
39. 512 U.S. at 58.
40. For an extensive analysis of this subject, see Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes,
Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803 (1999).
41. It can be argued that the Court’s recent approval of campaign contribution limits is a
fourth example. See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000).
42. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
43. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
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speech preference rationale of Metromedia has provided the authority
for invalidating many ordinances that failed to impose time limits on
signs advertising commercial events.44 The Discovery Network
rationale has provided similar authority for overturning ordinances
that failed to include signs with other traditional messages, including
political signs that did not pertain to election issues.45
A few courts have rejected the claim that Gilleo sanctions the
application of the Renton content neutral doctrine, have characterized
measures that impose time limits on election signs as content
discriminatory subject to strict scrutiny, and have struck them down
on that basis.46 If these courts are correct, and I doubt that they are,47
this outcome cannot be avoided. So long as political signs are
included within the definition of the time bound signs subject to
restriction, whether in terms or in effect, these courts will hold the
measure to be content discriminatory. The resulting application of
strict scrutiny is a certain death sentence for time limit measures
under federal constitutional law. Aesthetic considerations (with
apologies to ardent environmentalists) will never, ever, be held to be
compelling governmental interests. Safety considerations might be—
in the abstract. It is impossible, however, to conceive of a danger that
could be created by temporary political signs that would rise to that
level. One court justified the application of strict scrutiny by resort to
its state’s constitution, recognizing that Supreme Court decisions did
44. See Whitton v. City of Gladstone, 54 F.3d 1400 (8th Cir. 1995); Dimas v. City of
Warren, 939 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Mich. 1996); McCormack v. Township of Clinton, 872 F.
Supp. 1320 (D.N.J. 1994); Warms v. Springfield Township, No. 94-6610, 1994 WL 613660
(E.D. Pa. 1994), No. 94-6610, 1995 WL 318791 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Union City Board of Zoning
Appeals v. Justice Outdoor Displays, Inc., 467 S.E.2d 875 (Ga. 1996); Collier v. City of
Tacoma, 854 P.2d 1046 (Wash. 1993) (en banc); Fisher v. City of Charleston, 425 S.E.2d 194
(W. Va. 1992); Richard Spence, Union City Board of Zoning Appeals v. Justice Outdoor
Displays, 467 S.E.2d 875 (Ga. 1996), 26 STETSON L. REV. 1073, 1073-74 (1997).
45. See Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043 (3d Cir. 1994); Dimas v. City of
Warren, 939 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Mich. 1996); McCormack v. Township of Clinton, 872 F.
Supp. 1320 (D.N.J. 1994); City of Lakewood v. Colfax Unlimited Assn., Inc., 634 P.2d 52 (Col.
1981) (en banc); Van v. Travel Information Council, 628 P.2d 1217 (Ore. App. 1981).
46. See Whitton v. City of Gladstone, 54 F.3d 1400 (8th Cir. 1995); City of Euclid v.
Mabel, 484 N.E.2d 249 (Ohio App. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985); City of Antioch v.
Candidates’ Outdoor Graphic Service, 557 F. Supp. 52 (1982).
47. See Whitton v. City of Gladstone, 54 F.3d 1400, 1411, for the compelling dissent of
Judge Fagg.
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not require it.48 That court left open the possibility, however, that
longer limits and more vigorous efforts to improve the aesthetics of
the environment might lead to a different result.49
B. Defining the Places
Election sign restrictions may intrude upon the constitutional
rights of two quite distinct groups of people, the candidates (or those
interested in ballot propositions) and the property owners.50 Which
group is affected depends, most of the time but not always,51 on the
locations where the signs must be found to be subject to the
challenged regulation. Since the locations being regulated in Vincent
were entirely public property, the ordinance that the Court upheld
affected only candidates. It is important to emphasize, however, that
the Vincent Court held the property at issue, such as lamp posts, to be
a non-public forum.52 The Court has held that governments need not
abide by time, place, and manner standards in non-public fora.
Therefore, it would be a mistake to believe that Vincent allows
municipalities virtually free rein when they are regulating signs on
public property. Most of the public property on which election signs
are placed is in the public forum. In the public forum, municipalities
are limited in the restrictions they may impose by time, place, and
manner standards.
The quintessential public fora are streets and parks. A “street”
includes the entire right of way, not just the paved areas.
Accordingly, an ordinance that imposed unreasonable restrictions on
signs in areas “adjacent to highways”— in the public right of way—
was overturned.53 In residential areas the public right of way almost
48. See Collier v. City of Tacoma, 854 P.2d 1046 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
49. Id. at 1057.
50. See Arlington County Republican Comm. v. Arlington County, 983 F.2d 587 (4th Cir.
1993).
51. The regulation in Van v. Travel Information Council, 628 P.2d 1217 (Ore. App. 1981),
was overturned in part because it permitted only candidates and their committees, but not
private citizens, to display election signs.
52. For a description and analysis of public forum doctrine, see JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.47 (5th ed. 1995); FEDERAL LAND USE
LAW, supra note 1, § 6.03.
53. See Van v. Travel Information Council, 628 P.2d 1217 (Ore. App. 1981). See also
Arlington County Republican Comm. v. Arlington County, 983 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1993)
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always includes an area next to the street that homeowners tend to
think of incorrectly as their property. The ordinance in Collier v. City
of Tacoma54 permitted election signs in parking strips only with the
permission of the owner of the property abutting the strip. Assuming,
as I do, that the parking strips were in the street right of way, the
question arises whether requiring candidates to procure permission
from the abutting owners as a condition of allowing them to use the
public forum would pass muster if challenged by a candidate. In this
situation, the free speech interests of the candidates and of the
property owners may conflict rather than coincide.
Private property can be divided into residential and non-
residential categories. Whether they must be treated alike for
purposes of election sign regulation is uncertain.55 Non-residential
property may be divided between commercial/industrial and
farm/undeveloped. The catalog of reasons as to why election signs
are so important when placed on front lawns that the Court offered in
Gilleo56 have little, if any, pertinence to signs in areas zoned
commercial or industrial, although they may be relevant to
regulations of farmland and open spaces. However, in the
commercial speech preference rationale of Metromedia, the Court
was particularly emphatic in stressing that it was impermissible to
restrict businesses to commercial messages, that they must be
allowed to display signs with political messages.57 Apparently, then,
the issue would be whether a reason can be found that justifies
imposing time limits on election signs in non-residential areas that
are different from those imposed on the same signs in residential
areas.
One final problem is worth mentioning. Residential zones usually
contain both occupied and unoccupied lots. Gilleo obviously controls
the regulation of election signs on occupied lots. But Gilleo’s
rationale is only marginally persuasive, if that, when applied to
(concerning a restriction on the numbers of signs rather than on time).
54. 854 P.2d 1046 (Wash. 1993)(en banc).
55. Orazio v. Town of North Hempstead, 426 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), restricted
campaign signs in non-residential areas, but the restriction was of wall signs, not the temporary
signs under discussion.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
57. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 520-21.
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vacant lots. Here the issue of whose rights are being impinged comes
to the fore. Are candidates constitutionally entitled to put their signs
on vacant lots so long as the owner does not object? Or are the
municipality’s interests in aesthetics sufficient to allow it to ban all
signs on vacant lots that are not placed there by the owners?
C. Defining the Time Limit
In the process of declaring election sign regulations
unconstitutional for other reasons, many courts have stated in dictum
that reasonable time limits would be allowed.58 The catch, of course,
is defining “reasonable.” The regulation may limit how long before
the election the sign may be displayed, or how long after the election
it may be retained, or both.59 The easier part is defining the period
subsequent to the event because the message on the sign then has no
utility. It has no utility, that is, when the covered event is the final
election scheduled to resolve the subject. If the election is one of a
sequence— if, for example, the covered event is a primary election
leading up to a general election— the sign’s utility is not ended. A
number of ordinances have specifically allowed the signs of the
winners of the primary election to remain on display throughout the
period between the primary and the general election.60 That detail
aside, the only other consideration is giving the sign’s owner a fair
chance to remove it. Any plausibly reasonable period, such as one
week, ought to be satisfactory. Two cases have approved limits of ten
days following elections.61
58. See Verrilli v. City of Concord, 548 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1977); Baldwin v.
Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1370 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom., Leipzig v. Baldwin,
431 U.S. 913 (1977); McCormack v. Township of Clinton, 872 F. Supp. 1320, 1326 (D.N.J.
1994); City of Lakewood v. Colfax Unlimited Ass’n, 634 P.2d 52, 63 (Colo. 1981) (en banc);
Town of Huntington v. Estate of Schwartz, 313 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Dist. Ct. 1970); Fisher v. City of
Charleston, 425 S.E.2d 194, 201 (W. Va. 1992).
59. Recall that the regulation will also have to cover other time bound events in order to
satisfy Discovery Network. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Because of that
requirement, care must be taken in formulating the allowable time periods. It may be necessary
to cover the different kinds of signs in different sections of the regulation.
60. See, e.g., Curry v. Prince George’s County, 33 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D. Md. 1999); Dimas
v. City of Warren, 939 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Collier v. City of Tacoma, 854 P.2d
1046 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
61. See Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508
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Defining the starting point, the date before which signs may not
be displayed, is a much more problematic venture. Any such limit
must be viewed with skepticism because it will have been formulated
by incumbents, who are less likely than their potential opponents to
need to establish name recognition. Obviously, the group whose
interests are primarily at stake here are the candidates. Homeowners
may also have an interest, but it cannot be as substantial as that of the
candidates. Three cases have struck down sixty day limits as
inadequate.62 Another invalidated a forty-five day period, but mainly
because the court read Gilleo as virtually outlawing restrictions that
apply to homeowners.63 Twenty years ago, in a decision the Supreme
Court summarily affirmed, a federal court of appeals declared in
dictum that a three week limit was inadequate.64
Nevertheless, common sense dictates that some outer limit should
be permissible. Whether there should be one limit or many is
debatable. Two cases have upheld general restrictions on the total
time temporary signs may be displayed that made no specific
reference to election dates.65 Perhaps the limit should vary depending
on the office or ballot issue (for example, statewide or local). That
would complicate the task of drafting the regulation. I have no idea
what impartial sources a court might consult in determining whether
any given limit would adequately protect the rights of individuals
while at the same time giving municipalities some discretion in
protecting environmental concerns. Absent a controlling decision
from the Supreme Court, each case will establish its own starting
point, depending on the expert testimony and other evidence offered
in that case.
U.S. 830 (1993); Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949 (D. Haw. 1972).
62. City of Antioch v. Candidates’ Outdoor Graphic Service, 557 F. Supp. 52, 61 (N.D.
Cal. 1982); Van v. Travel Information Council, 628 P.2d 1217, 1227 (Ore. Ct. App. 1981);
Collier v. City of Tacoma, 854 P.2d 1046, 1058 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
63. Curry v. Prince George’s County, 33 F. Supp. 2d 447, 455 (D. Md. 1999).
64. See John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1980), aff’d, 545 U.S.
916 (1981).
65. See City of Waterloo v. Markham, 600 N.E.2d 1320 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (allowing
ninety days total for all temporary signs); Brayton v. City of New Brighton, 519 N.W.2d 243
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (during apparently undefined “election season”).
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III. CONCLUSION
Properly interpreted, Supreme Court decisions permit local
governments to impose reasonable time restrictions on election signs.
The restrictions must also cover signs bearing other time bound
messages, commercial and traditional. Subject to that qualification
the validity of such measures ought to be tested only under the less
rigorous scrutiny applicable to other content neutral time, place, and
manner regulations. Whether signs on non-residential property may
be treated differently from those on residential property is unclear,
but doing so raises difficult constitutional questions. Establishing a
period after an election during which signs must be removed appears
to be relatively risk free. Establishing a period before an election
during which signs cannot be displayed presents great constitutional
difficulties. Fixing a uniform period may not be possible.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/14
